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Society approaches health and safety risks in a piecemeal fashion. Reg-
ulators attempt to control the risks in their domain as if regulations were
the only factor preventing injuries at home, in the workplace, and on the
highways. Similarly, the courts address accidents with rules that not only
discourage, but sometimes also forbid, consideration of norms and institu-
tions outside the tort system. Academic commentators share this blind
spot, focusing on only one method of managing risks and recommending,
for example, an optimal tort liability structure' or an appropriate level of
stringency for an administrative regulation.2
These methods and analyses are valuable, but they do not consider the
complexities arising from the overlap of market forces, tort law, social
insurance, and government regulation.' Each of these institutions influ-
ences the management of risks in important ways. And each has effects
that, when combined, create dissonance between risks and societal
responses. Without coordination of these risk-reduction systems, society
will rarely invest optimally.to achieve the goals of creating efficient incen-
tives and providing appropriate compensation to injured parties. Further,
even if society is not over- or under-responsive to risks as a whole, it may
t George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke University. This Article is the result of a project
sponsored in part by the American Law Institute Project on Compensation and Liability for Product
and Process Injuries. Richard Stewart, the director of the A.L.I. project, stimulated my interest in this
topic and provided invaluable suggestions. I assume sole responsibility for this Article's contents.
1. For discussions of optimal tort liability structures, see generally W. LANDES & R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS (1983); S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). Shavell also
provides an excellent discussion of the choice between regulation and tort liability. See also R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.1-6.16 (3d ed. 1986).
2. See, e.g., R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 32-57 (1983); W.K. VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH
AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 114-35 (1983) [hereinafter W. K. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE].
3. Exceptions include Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 184 (1987); Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensa-
tion and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1984) [hereinafter Viscusi, Structuring a Disease
Policy].
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still react inefficiently to certain large risks. The solution to the problem
lies in finding an appropriate mix of market incentives, tort liability,
social insurance, and regulation.4
The recent increase in the number of mass product liability suits and
toxic tort claims arising from exposure to carcinogens and other harmful
substances makes more evident the necessity of finding the appropriate
mix of risk-management institutions. The tort system does not address
these accidents as well as the ones it has traditionally encountered.5
This Article argues that the optimal mix of risk-reduction institutions
requires a diminished role for the tort system. Markets and government
regulations generally can create more efficient risk-reduction incentives;
social insurance generally provides more appropriate compensation to the
injured. There are good reasons to retain the tort system, but its role
should diminish as risks to health and safety increase in number, dura-
tion, and complexity. The new practical and analytical question about tort
liability is how to make it an effective adjunct to more efficient regulatory
and insurance schemes.
This Article compares four risk-management systems: the market, tort
liability, social insurance, and regulation. It discusses their relative merits
and deficiencies and shows why regulation and insurance deserve larger
roles in addressing health and safety risks. This Article uses examples of
both product-related and work-related risks because both are addressed by
each of the four institutions analyzed. Part I considers the scope of risk
coverage of each regime. Part II analyzes each institution's information
needs and capabilities with respect to risk-reduction incentives. This Part
finds that government regulation is appropriate for gathering data and
disseminating clear standards, even if it may be less flexible than the other
institutions discussed. Part III examines the adequacy of each institution's
risk-reduction incentives and demonstrates that although regulatory mech-
anisms can generate these incentives, the current tort system does not do
so efficiently. Part IV addresses the level of compensation available under
each regime. Part V synthesizes the analyses of the four institutions and
discusses the structural problems of institutional overlap in the current
approach to managing risks. It advocates minimizing this overlap by revi-
talizing doctrines that bar tort liability and by viewing remedial possibili-
ties more broadly. This Article concludes that the tort system should
4. I have recently addressed the problem in more limited contexts. See, e.g., Viscusi, Product
Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 300 (1988) [hereinafter Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation]; Viscusi, Liability for
Occupational Accidents and Illnesses, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 155 (1988).
5. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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occupy a secondary role in addressing the distinctive and challenging
health and safety risks that confront society.
I. The Scope of Risk Coverage
It is impossible to determine what role a risk-reduction mechanism
should play without first determining what types of events it can address.
This Part describes the scope of risk coverage of four mechanisms-the
market, tort liability, social insurance, and regulation-and lays a founda-
tion for a discussion of the optimal relationship among them.
A. Markets
The current approach to risk management generally limits markets to
addressing injuries resulting from voluntary transactions. Although parties
do not explicitly trade health and safety risks, they do so implicitly
because these risks are attributes of market-traded commodities. For
example, workers accept potentially hazardous jobs only if there are com-
pensating factors that make the job as attractive as safer alternatives.'
Such offsetting advantages include higher wages and compensation for in-
come loss due to injuries.'
Although most of the literature on market premiums for risk focuses on
wage rates and occupational risks,' similar differentials accompany other
hazards implicitly traded in markets. For example, consumers demand
some offsetting advantage to smaller automobiles, such as greater fuel
economy, to compensate for the cars' lower crashworthiness. Depending
upon consumer preferences, these tradeoffs may be substantial.
Perfect markets for risk provide efficient compensation and incentives to
operate safely. However, markets often do not operate in an ideal fash-
ion.9 The strongest departure from a perfect market occurs when even
implicit markets for risk do not exist. For example, the current depletion
of the ozone layer in the atmosphere imposes risks on future generations.
Although our descendants might be willing to pay us to alter our behav-
ior, there is no means for them to do so.
The inadequacy of the insurance market aggravates the effects of the
6. These differentials are calculated with reference to the marginal worker, i.e., the worker least
willing to accept risky employment. Those who are more willing to accept risks receive a windfall
because they are paid the wage necessary to entice the marginal worker to engage the relevant risks.
Several studies demonstrate that as risks to health and safety increase, wages must increase to attract
employees. For a review of these studies, see W.K. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 2, at 37-58.
Typically, empirical studies focus on differences in wages, holding constant other attributes of the
occupations.
7. See id. at 37-39.
8. See id. at 98-102.
9. For a more complete discussion of the sources of market failure, see id. at 59-75.
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lack of implicit risk markets. A number of factors impede the development
of efficient insurance agreements. First, adverse selection, whereby only
high-risk customers purchase insurance, can prevent the emergence of any
insurance coverage for important classes of risk."0 Second, adverse incen-
tives, or moral hazard, can impede the growth of insurance markets by
reducing incentives to avoid injuries. 1 Third, even when insurance mar-
kets do exist, the premiums charged are actuarially unfair because they
necessarily include a reasonable profit for insurers. 2
Finally, inaccuracies in risk perception also impede the development of
efficient markets." People tend to overestimate low probability risks,1"
such as the chance that a child might be poisoned from household chemi-
cal products, ' 5 or that someone might have tampered with a bottle of
medicine. 6 When individuals overestimate a risk, the price they demand
to engage the risk is too high. Conversely, if they underestimate a risk, the
price they demand is too low. In both cases, the imperfect market pro-
duces inefficient incentives to reduce risk and inappropriate compensation
to those engaging the risk.' 7
10. For a cogent explanation of the impact of adverse selection on the "insurance crisis" of the
1980s, see Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
11. For a discussion of moral hazard, see Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968).
12. Insurance is actuarially unfair because of loading factors, or the gap between premiums and
expected payments. The social insurance programs that suffer least from this phenomenon are state
workers' compensation schemes. Nevertheless, even under those systems, workers receive only 80 cents
in expected benefits per dollar contributed. See generally Viscusi & Moore, Workers' Compensation:
Wage Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS
249 (1987). Loading factors are even higher for private insurance. These aspects of insurance market
coverage imply that people will tend to be underinsured, as compared to the perfect market case.
13. For a discussion of the literature on the psychological aspects of taking risks, see B.
FISCHHOFF, S. LICHTENSTEIN, P. SLOVIC, S. DERBY & R. KEENEY, ACCEPTABLE RISK 28-30
(1986).
14. These systematic overreactions to risks are discussed by Magat, Viscusi & Huber, Risk-Dollar
Tradeoffs, Risk Perceptions, and Consumer Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 83 (W.K. Viscusi & W. Magat eds. 1987) iherein-
after LEARNING ABOUT RISK] (essays discussing effects of risk on consumer and worker preferences)
(1987).
15. Id. at 93-96.
16. Sales of Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules dropped 87% after seven people died from ingesting
Tylenol laced with cyanide. For a discussion of the Tylenol tragedy, see Viscusi, Market Incentives
for Safety, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 133. Although a well-designed label or other means
of providing information might mitigate this problem, additional information does not address the
fundamental matter of consumer psychology.
17. It has been suggested that because of these aspects of risk perception, markets can function
effectively for safety risks but not for health risks. See, e.g., W.K. VIscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS:
AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE 264-67 (1979) [hereinafter W.K. ViscUsi, EM-
PLOYMENT HAZARDS]. While this is often a valid simplification, it is not always the case, and it does
not reflect the contribution of recent research with respect to risk perception. See generally LEARNING
ABOUT RISK, supra note 14. Not all safety risks are evident, and many health risks may be quite well
known, particularly those that have been publicized. To the extent that safety risks are visible and
health risks are hidden, a health/safety dichotomy is useful. However, a more appropriate basis for
making distinctions than the health/safety dichotomy is whether there are opportunities to acquire
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B. Tort Liability
Whereas the market's inability to affect anything other than voluntary
transactions limits its use as a risk-management institution, the tort sys-
tem's relative inflexibility restricts the reach of that institution as well.
The tort system requires injured parties to comply with formal legal rules
before they receive any compensation. For example, under the broad the-
ory of negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a "prepon-
derance of the evidence" that the defendant's "negligent conduct" was the
"legal cause" of the "injury" suffered by the plaintiff."8 Similarly, in an
action based on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the "defective product" in question was the "legal cause" of
plaintiff's injuries.' 9 In both of these formulations, every word and phrase
is filled with meanings and interpretations that act as hurdles in the plain-
tiff 's effort to receive compensation."0 Therefore, the tort system provides
compensation for only a subset of all injuries: those that meet these
restrictive criteria.2" In contrast, market forces generate compensating dif-
ferentials for all additional risks imposed by particular products or activi-
ties. 2 Plaintiffs can often experience extreme difficulty demonstrating that
a particular defendant caused an injury, especially for injuries with multi-
ple potential causes that pose long-term health risks."3 Furthermore, even
if causal relationships are fully understood, which is seldom the case, the
history of individual exposures to the diverse causes of a disease is rarely
information about the risk without substantial cost.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
19. Id. § 402A.
20. In addition to negligence and strict liability, a plaintiff can demonstrate liability on a number
of other theories. For an overview of liability in tort, see W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, W. KEETON &
D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 28-81 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]. For a discussion of product liability, see R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW: A LEGAL REVOLUTION (1980).
21. Thus, for example, all surgical patients whose operations have adverse outcomes will not
receive compensation through the tort system.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
23. Striking examples of these problems are the asbestos and Agent Orange debacles. For a gen-
eral discussion of the unique difficulties in determining causation in these types of situations, see P.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 29-30, 185-86,
268-72 (1987); see also Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal
Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579 (1987); Viscusi, supra note 3, at 66-68; see infra Part lI.B.
Judicial doctrines and remedies can provide relief to plaintiffs suffering ailments of uncertain ori-
gin. However, wariness about forcing the role of general insurer on manufacturers necessarily limits
this trend. A good example of a creative remedy to overcome the difficulties of multiple and probabi-
listic causation is found in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1980). In Sindell, the plaintiff, a victim of birth defects allegedly caused by diethyl-
stilbesterol (DES), was unable to identify the source of the DES ingested by her mother. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court apportioned liability among the codefendant manufacturers of DES according to
their respective market shares and shifted the burden of proof to the defendant manufacturers. To
escape liability, a manufacturer had to prove that it could not have supplied the DES that allegedly
caused the injuries.
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known. The tort system can handle only hazards with discrete, easily
traceable causes.
C. Social Insurance
The scope of social insurance is potentially all-inclusive. Except for
scarcity of funding, there is no inherent barrier to providing general cov-
erage of risks. For example, compensation for disability under the Social
Security program is extensive, but the level of benefits is low 2' due to the
program's comprehensiveness and its limited resources.2" Targeted social
insurance programs, such as workers' compensation, share some of the
tort system's impediments to coverage. To receive compensation, the
claimant must show "by a preponderance of the evidence" 6 that an injury
occurred and that the injury arose "out of and in the course of employ-
ment."'27 In contrast to tort liability, however, social insurance programs
award benefits regardless of fault.2"
D. Regulation
The potential scope of regulation is limited only by the imaginations of
regulators.29 The government can influence a range of outcomes that sup-
plements or displaces both the market, which operates largely ex ante, and
tort liability, which operates ex post.
Current regulatory efforts differ in their scope of coverage. The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) can regulate only particular
activities,3" whereas the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a
24. The main effect of the program is to provide a benefits floor; the degree of income replace-
ment is a declining function of the risk level. See Social Security Act of 1956, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
25. W.K. VISCUSI, WELFARE OF THE ELDERLY 233-39 (1979).
26. See, e.g. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202.5 (West Supp. 1988). But cf N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW
§ 21 (Consol. 1982) ("[T]he contents of medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claim-
ants for compensation shall constitute prima facie evidence of fact as to the matter contained
therein.").
27. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 10 (Con-
sol. Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (1987). See also Note, Compensating Victims of Occupa-
tional Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 918 (1980) (quoting Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in
Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 541 (1954)).
28. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 84. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1988); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 10 (Consol. Supp. 1987). But see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-1 (West Supp. 1988) (requiring "actual or lawfully imputed negligence" on part of
employer).
29. in some instances, however, the Constitution may restrict one's imagination. See, e.g., Indus-
trial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 105(c)(1) (1982) (granting authority to carry out National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5851 (1982)
(outlining duties of Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
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broader mandate encompassing a wide range of hazards." The form of
the regulations promulgated reflects the flexibility of the administrative
apparatus. For example, most government regulations focus on design as-
pects of technologies 2 or on externalities that the regulated activity gener-
ates." In some cases, however, regulations emphasize defective aspects of
the initial design 4 or defects arising from errors in the manufacturing
process."' This flexibility gives regulation the broadest potential scope of
any of the risk-management institutions, combining the coverage of the
market with that of tort liability.
II. Risk-Management Institutions and the Problem of Information
No risk-management institution can function without basic information
concerning the event, the type of injury, and the extent of damages. This
Part assesses the performance of each institution with respect to its infor-
mation requirements and its ability to generate and to integrate data that
are relevant to risks.
A. Information Requirements: Variations Among the Institutions
Each institution requires different information. The choice among insti-
tutions in a particular case depends in part on the costs of acquiring the
appropriate data. Markets, for example, require ex ante information
about risks. In response to this information, consumers form perceptions
about risks. These, in turn, generate wage and price differentials that
reflect consumers' valuations of safety.3 An individual firm must consider
these differentials and compare them with the cost of risk-reduction mea-
sures. Provided that it correctly perceives information about risk, the nor-
mal functioning of the market satisfies other key information requirements
of firms. Under tort liability, ex post knowledge about the relative contri-
bution of each party to the final outcome is more important than precise
knowledge of ex ante risk levels.37 Because an injured individual must
31. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982) and in 84 Stat. 2086
(1970) (creating and outlining duties of EPA).
32. E.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.211-.222 (1987) (OSHA machinery and machine guard standards).
33. E.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982) (regulating emissions as
an externality).
34. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) recalls usually focus on problems that extend
across an entire product line rather than on manufacturing defects that arise sporadically. For a
discussion of the emphasis of consumer product safety regulation, see generally W.K. Viscusi, REGU-
LATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY (1984).
35. For example, auto recalls by NHTSA often occur after accidents arising from a defect are
reported to the Agency, Auto safety regulation is analyzed generally in G. BLOMQUIST, THE REGU-
LATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY (1988).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
37. In the case of probabilistic causation, however, these require similar knowledge about risk.
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prove a theory of liability, 8 he also requires some information about the
costs of safety measures that the risk-producing party might have taken.
In addition, the amount of damages might involve substantial
uncertainties regarding the amount of lost future earnings and medical
expenses.89 Finally, when available, scientific information regarding the
risk generation process can play a central role in the context of the tort
system.4 °
Social insurance systems typically have far fewer information require-
ments than either the market or the tort system. The insuring agency gen-
erally needs to know only the nature of the injury and its effect on the
victim.41 Targeted social insurance, such as workers' compensation, may
require information about the claimant's earnings, the severity of the
injury, and other variables. Typically, however, information needs are
modest because these systems provide benefits without requiring that the
recipient demonstrate fault."'
Government regulations generally have the greatest information
requirements because they attempt to control risks on a centralized basis.
The government must assess a risk, measure it using existing economic
estimates of risk-benefit values, and calculate the cost of compliance."3
Narrowly specified legislative mandates can simplify these tasks, however.
The great benefit of regulation is that every party covered by the regula-
tion does not incur information costs. In contrast, the tort system imposes
information costs for every case.44
For example, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980), the amount of damages each defendant was ordered to contribute ex post could have been
determined ex ante. For a discussion of Sindell, see supra note 23. See also infra Part II.B (general
discussion of determining multiple and probabilistic causation).
38. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
39. These problems arise not from legal doctrine but from economic uncertainties. For instance,
one does not know what the cost of medical care will be in two decades.
40. Such information can be used to establish causation where multiple potential factors are
involved. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 8-9.
41. Consider, for example, the provision of the federal disability insurance benefit payment pro-
gram that specifies who may qualify for benefits under the program. Social Security Act of 1956
§ 223, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (Supp. IV 1986).
42. See supra note 28.
43. An ideal market accomplishes all these tasks automatically. See supra text accompanying
notes 6-8.
44. The plaintiff need not prove every fact relevant to his case in all circumstances. But even
"facts" that seem self-evident, or nearly so, will usually have to be established to the satisfaction of the
trier of fact. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (trial court
erred in taking judicial notice of cause-effect relationship between exposure to asbestos and develop-
ment of respiratory disease); Laster v. Celotex Corp., 587 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (refusing to
take judicial notice of same "fact" because of complex etiology of asbestosis).
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B. Problems with Multiple and Probabilistic Causation
The case of an illness with multiple possible causes illustrates the dif-
ferences in information requirements among the risk-management institu-
tions.45 In the market, individuals must acquire information about the
probabilistic linkages between their activities and the potential for inju-
ries. This approach stands in marked contrast with targeted social insur-
ance, in which the insuring (governmental) entity establishes causal links,
and government regulation, in which agencies use long-term studies to
estimate causal probabilities. Although social costs arise in each regime,
placing the burden of analyzing causation on the government rather than
on injured individuals meets efficiency and equity concerns.
The greatest inefficiencies occur in the tort system because the claimant
must establish liability through an evidentiary showing."' The informa-
tion required is much greater than that for simply assessing a probability
distribution for an outcome, as is the case with markets.47 Multiple classes
of causes, all of which have probabilistic effects and none of which can be
conclusively determined ex post to have been the cause of the disease, ex-
acerbate these difficulties." Courts must obtain some ex post information
about the size of the ex ante risk caused by the injurer's action and the
relative role of this risk within the context of all risk exposures. Courts
can ease the difficulty of determining liability by holding an act to be the
legal cause of an injury only if that act was a "substantial factor" in
bringing about the harm."' In these cases, the magnitude of the risk itself
is not the dispositive economic factor.
This backward-looking procedure reverses the approach of government
agencies that examine prospective risks associated with exposure to
hazards. Although specific aspects of the plaintiff's physical condition and
45. Multiple and probabilistic causation is characteristic of toxic tort cases. See P. SCHUCK, supra
note 23, at 268.
46. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
47. Although some courts have apportioned liability based on market share when a disease can be
linked to a particular product class, this approach has been applied primarily to DES cases. See supra
note 23. On occasion, market share liability has also been applied in asbestos cases. Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334
(5th Cir. 1982).
48. For example, if exposure to pesticide residues in beef were to pose a risk of stomach cancer of
only one in one million, and if this were the only such risk faced by an individual, then the beef
producer should bear full liability even though the risk was not great. Alternatively, if the stomach
cancer risk from pesticides in beef were one in ten thousand, but an individual's risk from all expo-
sures were ten in ten thousand, then to set the damage amounts efficiently, each of the sources should
be assigned liability in proportion to its respective contribution to the injury. Otherwise, a defendant
who is but one of the many producers of the risk will be penalized as though the defendant produced
the sole cause of the adverse outcome.
49. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 41. See also Hill v. Edmonds, 26 A.D.2d 554, 270
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1966). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 431 comment a.
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activities may be important and difficult to assess in some cases, 50 the
overall task of adjudication is not intrinsically harder than that faced by
regulatory agencies. There is, however, a fundamental difference in scope.
Except within the context of multiple plaintiffs, such as a class action for
a toxic tort, courts must analyze cases individually, with experts present-
ing their views on the underlying scientific facts. Government agencies, on
the other hand, devote considerable resources to funding long-term analy-
ses assessing the merits of the regulation.51
Increases in scientific complexity generally reduce the tort system's
effectiveness because the individual case approach is not well-suited to
broad scientific inquiry. Courts do have an advantage when the relevant
information is highly case-specific. However, as toxic tort cases and large-
scale product liability claims become more common, the judicial system
will become an increasingly inefficient forum for risk management.
C. Incentives to Generate and Integrate Risk Information
Because risks evolve in number and complexity, an effective risk-
management institution must continually generate and integrate new risk
information. For hazards with well-known risks, such as the dangers
posed by motor vehicles, this issue is not particularly relevant. There may
be little information, however, about the potential risks involved in newer
products or activities. This section evaluates each institution's ability to
generate and integrate new risk information.
1. Markets
Market forces do not create strong incentives to generate risk informa-
tion for several reasons. First, private incentives to generate information
are less than socially optimal because information is a public good that
can be repeatedly transferred regardless of its producer's assent or com-
pensation.52 Second, there is little incentive for the producer of a risky
product to generate risk information. Indeed, the real incentive may be to
conceal information because it is difficult to sell consumers dangerous
products or to find workers for risky jobs if risks are well known.5
50. For example, any assessment of the contribution of asbestos exposures to an individual lung
cancer case will depend on the individual's smoking history. See Viscusi, Structuring a Disease Policy,
supra note 3, at 54.
51. For an example of such a study, see Kolp & Viscusi, Uncertainty in Risk Analysis: A Retro-
spective Assessment of the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard, in 4 ADVANCRS IN APPLIED MICRO-
ECONOMICS 105 (1986).
52. This fundamental point was first made by Kenneth Arrow. K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THE-
ORY OF RISK-BEARING 171-74 (1971). The special characteristics of risk information are explored in
W.K. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS supra note 17, at 113-33.
53. Although market incentives to perform risk-related research and to provide information are
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The most striking aspect of markets for risk is how rapidly they inte-
grate new information. New risk information has been identified as a
major source of employee turnover,54 and the wage rates workers demand
are demonstrably sensitive to changes in employee knowledge about
risks.55 Consumers respond in a similar fashion because they quickly inte-
grate risk information into their purchasing decisions."' Indeed, experi-
mental evidence strongly suggests that consumers overreact to low-
probability risks brought to their attention.57
Overall, although markets create relatively weak incentives to engage in
formal risk research, consumers' and workers' experiences become data in
their risk-taking calculus. In this way, markets do provide risk-reduction
incentives.
2. Tort Liability and Social Insurance
Neither the tort system nor social insurance programs undertake any
fundamental risk-related research. Court proceedings can, however,
induce firms and claimants to conduct risk research to document their
cases." Subsequent publicity surrounding the case can often be an addi-
tional source of general risk information."
In tort litigation, plaintiffs present information to link an injury with
some product or activity. The efficacy of the judicial system in producing
risk-related information decreases as the complexity of the link increases.
For example, although courts can analyze injuries involving mechanical
defects, 60 judges and jurors are simply not trained to make decisions about
not efficient, consumers and workers can acquire information in other ways. For example, they learn
about risky products and activities through both their own experiences and those of others. Other
nonpersonal sources of information also provide data about risks less expensively. Hazard warnings
represent one prominent source of information. In addition, some occupations and products impose
obvious risks. See generally W.K. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS, supra note 17, at 113-43; Vis-
cusi & O'Connor, Hazard Warnings for Workplace Risks: Effects on Risk Perceptions, Wage Rates,
and Turnover, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 14, at 98, 119-24 (1987).
54. See W.K. Viscusi, RISK By CHoIcE, supra note 2, at 63-69.
55. See generally Viscusi & O'Connor, supra note 53. Workers with substantial seniority may be
locked into their positions. However, this is not a significant problem because job risks tend to be
concentrated among new hires.
56. See generally Viscusi, Magat & Huber, The Effect of Risk Information on Precautionary
Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 14.
57. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
58. An area of concern, however, is the probable asymmetry of available funds. If the risk pro-
ducer is better able to conduct the risk-related research, the information may not be made public
because, although the risk producer will have an incentive to conduct research, it will not have an
incentive to divulge negative findings. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
59. E.g. Firms Must Share Blame in DES Suit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 4 (Week in Re-
view), at 8, col. 2 (discussing Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, supra note 23, and risks
associated with DES).
60. Manufacturing-defect or design-defect cases involve issues that are much easier to resolve than
those in toxic torts cases.
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complex and conflicting scientific evidence.61 This inability to make accu-
rate decisions may be no greater than that of the average consumer, but
tort liability does not attach without proof of a strong causal link.6 In
contrast, individuals make decisions using inconclusive, even fragmentary,
evidence every day.
3. Government Regulation
Government regulation is the most effective institution for generating
new risk information. Because information is a public good, one can argue
that information costs should be shared broadly. In addition, public fund-
ing of risk-related research is an efficient method of generating risk infor-
mation because it eliminates free riders.
The government generates different types of risk information. First,
agencies such as the National Institute of Health (NIH) and the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 'fund specific
research.6" Second, agencies such as EPA sponsor research within a more
targeted regulatory agenda."" Third, agencies such as the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) require detailed research regarding specific prod-
uct risks.65
In addition to having a superior capacity to generate risk information,
the government also disseminates risk information to assist private deci-
sionmaking66 and hires a technically trained staff to make decisions based
on scientific evidence. The benefits of government involvement increase
with the degree of specialization and complexity of data and with the
greater general need for the information in the economy."
61. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 23; Kelman, supra note 23.
62. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
63. All OSHA rulemakings are based on such externally provided medical research since the
research function in the job safety area was delegated to NIOSH in 1970. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669-671
(1982).
64. EPA has funded a substantial amount of research on communication to workers about
hazards. See, e.g., W.K. Viscusi & W. MAGAT, ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF IMPROVED
INFORMATION: PROJECT PERIOD Two REPORT (Mar. 1986).
65, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also,
H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 14-28 (1983).
66. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: CANCER (1982).
67. Conversely, idiosyncratic information that is not technically advanced can be generated
through experience in market contexts, see supra notes 6-8, or through ex post assessments in judicial
proceedings, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. These institutions may have an advantage
for more narrowly defined information acquisition and transmission.
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D. Institutional Dynamics: The Response to Change
A change in risk information necessarily affects how risk-management
institutions operate. An institution may be effective in a situation of
unchanging risks but may not adapt well to dynamic situations. For ex-
ample, consider how each regime would respond to new information indi-
cating that the health risk from some environmental hazard is much
greater than was originally thought.
The market would respond fairly rapidly as the new information about
risks affects risk perceptions. Changed perceptions would then create
financial incentives for firms; the market would respond as quickly as it
would if the cost of pollution control equipment were to drop. In both
cases, the new information would enhance the financial incentive for more
stringent pollution control. The corporate response might lag, however,
because of the capital-intensive nature of pollution reduction. That is, the
firm will not replace existing machinery until the cost of operating it
exceeds the cost of purchasing new capital. Therefore, firms are more
likely to invest in building new facilities than in modifying existing
facilities.6"
In general, the tort system is inflexible. New risk information is not of
great relevance except with respect to hazards that are a dominant cause
of illness or injury. Moreover, the tort system is relatively stable and does
not respond rapidly to changes in its environment." However, it is note-
worthy that the market more readily incorporates changes in a firm's pol-
lution control costs than do the courts because the firm presumably has
private information about these costs. To demonstrate negligence by prov-
ing that a firm failed to meet an appropriate standard of care, the plaintiff
would need access to the data used to make production decisions within
the firm. Thus, the market system reacts better than the tort system in this
example; the party responsible for making the relevant investment has
superior knowledge of the costs of different safety improvements.
The tort system might adapt well in limited situations, especially when
the environmental hazard in question is central to adjudication of the
claim. Furthermore, large-scale, high-profile litigation, such as the asbes-
tos cases, can promote publication of information about the risks involved
and provide an impetus for societal action against the hazard."0
The adaptability of social insurance varies widely according to legisla-
68. In the long run, firms will find it easier to adapt to changing regulatory requirements as new
facilities are constructed. Indeed, it is often desirable to incorporate environmental control regulation
at the time of new plant construction rather than to use add-on technology that may be more
expensive.
69. For a discussion of the stability of the common law, see R. POSNER, supra note 1, § 20.4.
70. See supra notes 23, 58-59.
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tors' risk perceptions. In this sense, social insurance is similar to the mar-
ket. To the extent that the main goal of social insurance schemes is to
provide compensation, however, this problem is not relevant. In any case,
the rigidity created by the necessity of formal legislative action in chang-
ing the statutory insurance scheme makes this institution relatively stable;
it will not typically be as flexible as the market.
This rigidity similarly limits the effectiveness of regulation, despite its
superiority to the tort system in other categories. First, changing economy-
wide regulations is administratively costly.7 Second, the sheer number of
firms that must comply with new standards imposes significant private
and social costs. Third, special interest groups resist amendments to regu-
lations if they do not preserve existing benefits.72
In addition to the problems of administration and implementation, there
are practical difficulties in changing regulations. Firms respond poorly to
changes in standards that specify compliance technologies. For example,
over the almost two decades since OSHA promulgated its first safety stan-
dards, it has made few substantive changes in the original regulations
until 1989.7" In addition, regulations that require firms to meet particular
exposure or emissions levels foster innovation only up to the level of the
standard and not beyond.7 4
The weakness of regulation in responding to changes in risk informa-
tion can be overcome by incorporating a price-oriented system that penal-
izes risky behavior, such as a pollution tax."5 The combination of regula-
tion and a price-oriented system promotes greater responsiveness and
adaptability to changes in risk information.7" The pricing mechanism
71. To make such changes, regulatory agencies must repeat the stages of the rulemaking process.
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
72. These may include the segment of the industry that has already complied with the regulation.
Textile mills in compliance with OSHA's cotton dust standard opposed the later relaxation of the
regulation. See Viscusi, Cotton Dust Regulation: An OSHA Success Story?, 4 J. PoL'y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 325 (1985).
73. OSHA recently promulgated a new regulation that "limits worker exposure on 164 substances
for the first time and strengthens the limits on 212 substances that are already regulated." Molotsky,
New Limits Imposed on Many Substances Found in Workplace, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at Al,
col. 1. Although John A. Pendergass, the Assistant Secretary of Labor who heads OSHA, claims that
the regulation "make[s] a 20-year leap forward in the level of worker protection", id. at A6, col. 5, the
effect of the new exposure limits remains to be seen. For a review of recent OSHA efforts to promul-
gate regulations, see Viscusi, The Structure and Enforcement of Job Safety Regulation, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1986, at 127. For a discussion of the reasons for OSHA's inability to promul-
gate more regulations, see Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and
Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4-14 (1989).
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. This problem can be addressed in part by adopting
technology-forcing regulations. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(iii) (1982) (requiring
"greatest degree of [automobile] emission reduction achievable").
75. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
Winter-Spring 1979, at 1, 4.
76. Proportional liability in the tort system could serve a similar function.
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reduces the government's information requirements because it does not
require knowledge about the costs of compliance, only the benefits. One
potential drawback is that firms still must generate information when
making compliance decisions. While this means that the costs of informa-
tion acquisition will likely remain the same, injury-producing entities
must bear these costs instead of the government."
III. Adequacy of Risk-Reduction Incentives
This Part evaluates each of the aforementioned institutions with respect
to the general goal of creating incentives to reduce risky activity. 8 Effi-
cient deterrence of risky activity means that the marginal cost of the incre-
mental reduction in risk equals the benefit of the reduction to society. The
efficient level of risk is typically nonzero, because the risk-dollar tradeoff
values are finite and additional risk reductions tend to become increasingly
expensive.79
A. Risk-Reduction Incentives and the Market
In perfect markets, risk-reduction incentives are adequate and efficient.
As the risks associated with any product become known, the market price
adjusts to reflect the price of persuading individuals to engage the risk."0
The market is in equilibrium when the cost of decreasing risk equals the
benefit of additional risk reduction.
The market for employment is a good illustration. Risk-producing
employers are deterred from risky activity by the premium amounts they
must pay workers to engage the risk. The risk-dollar tradeoff of the mar-
ginal worker engaging the risk determines the risk premium that must be
paid to all workers engaging the risk. Risk-reduction investments allow
lower risk premium payments. This creates financial incentives to reduce
risk until the marginal cost of risk reduction equals the marginal benefits
measured in terms of reduced risk premiums.
The risk-dollar tradeoffs reflected in market decisions vary widely
because of different worker perceptions of and attitudes toward risk."
Table 1 summarizes the results of a number of studies that estimate labor
markets for risk.
77. Savings in social costs will accrue if the efficient risk-reduction strategies are highly firm-
specific and hence could not have been effectively prescribed by regulators.
78. Because injuries can result from risky activity by either the producer or the injured person,
risk-reduction incentives apply to both parties.
79. This occurs because of diminishing marginal returns from risk-reduction investment. As in-
vestment increases, at some point it will cease to reduce risky activity.
80. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 6-8, 13-17 and accompanying text.
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All values are in 1987 dollars. The results for the Viscusi studies marked with an asterisk are evalu-
ated at the mean risk level for the sample for a model in which the heterogeneity in wage-risk trade-
offs was assessed.
82. Sources (referenced by Study number): (1) Brown, Equalizing Differences in the Labor Mar-
ket, 94 Q.J. EcON. 113 (1980); (2) Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on
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The most recent study indicates that the average worker values life
from $5,000,000 to $6,000,000.83 In addition to measuring the implicit
value of life, studies have also shown that the implicit value per year of
life lost is about $180,000 and the estimated value of nonfatal job-related
accidents is about $30,000 to $40,000.
These estimates reflect how individuals value small incremental changes
in risk, but not how they would demand to be compensated in terms of
risk premiums. An individual who values life at $5,000,000 would be
willing to accept a risk premium of $500 to engage a fatality risk of one in
ten thousand, but he would generally be unwilling to accept proportion-
ally larger risk premiums for greater risks.84 At some point, risk premi-
ums are inadequate to compensate the magnitude of risk the individual
engages. Therefore, because individuals are reluctant to accept risk premi-
ums for very high fatality risks, market incentives for producers are effi-
cient only within a range of moderately risky activities.85
Creating market incentives for product users is not a matter of concern
if all risk compensation is ex ante and if markets ignore the influences of
other risk-management institutions. Once an individual purchases an
item, he alone bears all of the loss. Shifting the full cost of the injury to
the product user internalizes the cost of safety. It also causes the producer
to incorporate consumer valuations of risk into the market price. As long
Dangerous Jobs, 16 J. HUM. RESOURCES 167 (1981); (3) R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1976); (4) THALER & ROSEN, The Value of
Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
(N. Terleckyj ed. 1976); (5) W.K. VISCUSi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MAR-
KET PERFORMANCE (1979); (6) W.K. VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE (1983); (7) Viscusi & O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to Chemical La-
beling: Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers? 74 AM. ECON. REV. 942 (1984); (8) Viscusi &
Moore, Workers' Compensation: Wage Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health
Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 249 (1987); (9) Moore & Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted
Value of Life, 26 ECoN. INQUIRY 369 (1988); (10) Moore and Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated
Value of Life: The Implications of New Occupational Fatality Data, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
476, 485 & Table 5 (1988).
83. Moore & Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results Using New Occupational
Fatality Data, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 476, 486 (1988). This is the most reliable of studies
in the field because it is the only one that uses a new set of death risk statistics developed by NIOSH.
Moreover, these data are the result of a detailed census of all occupational fatalities rather than a
partial sampling based on certain occupations. These deficiencies skewed the results of earlier studies,
summarized in Table 1, suggesting that the typical worker implicitly values life from under $1 million
to as much as $12 million.
Even with this improved data, this and all other studies of the value of life should be considered
with caution. Statistical estimates such as these are necessarily imprecise and should be used merely to
suggest a plausible range of risk-dollar tradeoffs, not to pinpoint a particular trade-off value.
84. Howard, On Making Life and Death Decisions, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 89 (1980).
85. Id.
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as markets are perfect, the parties will take the efficient level of precau-
tions to control risk.
The difficulty here, of course, is that markets are far from perfect.86
Specifically, information and transactions costs make complete internaliza-
tion of the costs of risk impossible. The resulting risk-reduction incentives
exist at less than efficient levels, giving rise to a greater than optimal
number of accidents.
B. Risk-Reduction Incentives and Tort Liability
Tort damages awards also create incentives for producers to control
risks. Firms can internalize damages payments as part of their production
costs.87 Even when firms insure against liability risks, they have an incen-
tive to reduce risky behavior because their insurance premiums often
reflect the long-term risks generated by their operations.88 The expected
costs of tort liability create financial incentives that are similar to the mar-
ket risk premium paid to workers.89
The so-called liability "crisis" of the 1980s is simply a reflection of the
market response to the increased costs imposed by tort liability." One
would expect some physicians to react to new economic incentives result-
ing from increased tort damages awards by changing their specialties.91
Decisions to discontinue products that are the subject of litigation are
rational responses to changing economic circumstances.92 Such changes are
not necessarily evidence of a crisis. The analysis needed to determine
whether a crisis exists, or whether an efficient redistribution of risky activ-
ities is taking place, must involve an evaluation of the tort system and of
how the liability insurance market functions.9"
Tort liability provides optimal deterrence as long as firms correctly
anticipate damages awards.94 Unfortunately, a variety of obstacles prevent
86. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
87. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
88. Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry: A Look at Market
Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 501, 506-11 (1988).
89. These incentives have been documented in the case of workers' compensation. See W.K. Vis-
CUSI & M. MOORE, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JoB RISKS (forthcoming from Princeton
University Press).
90. See Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance:
An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 389-95 (1988).
91. See Blair & Makar, The Structure of Florida's Medical Malpractice Insurance Market: If It
Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 428 (1988).
92. See P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 155-61
(1988).
93. For an overview of the current liability crisis, see the symposium Perspectives on the Insur-
ance Crisis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988).
94. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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a firm from developing a complete understanding of the true costs of its
risky activity. First, damages awards are not reliable indicators of all
damages to actual victims. Courts base awards on the loss to the plaintiff
without considering other accident victims who did not file a claim or
were unable to obtain compensation." Thus, firms may have inadequate
information concerning the damages of victims who did not bring success-
ful claims. Second, not all firms actually contemplate paying the damages
awards assessed. Speculative ventures may have short time horizons, and
new and well-established enterprises alike may reorganize under federal
bankruptcy law to limit liability when faced with the prospect of particu-
larly large claims.9 Third, the size of a damages award does not always
reflect the true damages suffered by the injured party. To provide efficient
deterrence incentives in a tort system that compensates all accident vic-
tims, the damages award must give the producer the same incentives to
exercise care as do private valuations.9"
Table 2 provides some information concerning the distribution of prod-
uct liability payments by severity of injury.
95. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text; see infra text accompanying note 168 and
Table 5.
96. A striking example of the difficulties posed by very large losses is that of asbestos related
compensation and, in particular, the recently concluded reorganization of Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion. See generally Gwynne, Humbled But Raring to Go, TIME, Nov. 21, 1988, at 113. Indeed, the
stakes potentially involved exceeded the resources of Manville's insurers. See Viscusi, Structuring a
Disease Policy, supra note 3, at 68.
97. If a producer can reduce a product's risk by a factor of 10,000 and each of the potentially
injured parties values this reduction at $400, then the damages award should be $4,000,000 to create
efficient incentives.
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Table 298
Distribution of Payments By Severity of Bodily Injury
Percentage
Severity of of Parties Average Percentage of
Injury w/Payment Payment Total Payments
Death 3.6 $232,391 18.8
Permanent Total 3.0 446,656 29.9
Disability
Permanent Partial 2.3 275,010 14.2
Disability
Temporary Total 23.0 28,955 15.0
Disability
No Disability 68.2 14,444 22.2
Total 100.0 44,408 100.0
Unknown --- 74,026
All figures are in 1985 dollars.
The Table shows that the average individual receives far more for per-
manent disability ($446,656) than for a fatality ($232,391). Even more
startling is the fact that the average award for a fatality is typically an
order of magnitude below private valuations.99 Thus, tort liability is often
not an efficient deterrent because tort awards are less than private valua-
tions of risk.
The tort damages assessment procedure' 00 explains this sort of
undercompensation. Consider three cases: (1) an individual with no de-
pendents who is killed; (2) a head of a household who is killed; and (3) a
single wage earner who is injured. In the first case, unless statutes provide
compensation to the estate, there are no damages awarded because no
party requires compensation.' Courts tend to focus only on meeting the
income needs of surviving dependents. When there are no such depen-
dents, damages are zero and deterrence is suboptimal.
In the second case, involving the death of a head of a household, courts
base the level of damages on the present value of the deceased's earn-
98. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY: A TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 113 (1977).
99. Individuals receive, for a fatality, an average tort award of $232,391, see supra Table 2, but
implicitly value life from $5,000,000 to $6,000,000, see supra Table 1 and note 83 and accompanying
text.
100. A commonly used compendium that reviews the tort damages assessment procedures is
S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975).
101. Id. § 10:1.
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ings.' °2 They then reduce the award by the amount of income that would
have been consumed by the deceased.' 03 Because many commodities are
jointly consumed, there is less than a fifty percent reduction for a two-
person household.'0 4 Nevertheless, the reduction in damages is often sub-
stantial, and it reflects the general approach that tort liability takes in
addressing the income needs of survivors. By ignoring the implicit valua-
tion of the deceased's life,'08 tort liability damages fail to provide appro-
priate compensation and deterrence.
In the case of a nonfatal injury, tort damages include the present value
of both lost earnings and future medical expenses attributable to the acci-
dent.'0 6 There is no consumption deduction in this case.' 7 In spite of this,
the safety incentives provided by tort liability for nonfatal accidents are
inadequate for two reasons. First, tort damages compensate individual vic-
tims only for their actual losses. Because some victims are exposed to risk
without injury and some other victims never file suit, damages awards do
not accurately reflect the harms produced by risky behavior. Second,
although the system may compensate for pain and suffering, the financial
component of tort damages tends to drive the award.'
If tort damages were to compensate for lost years of life expectancy,
then the tort system could provide efficient deterrence of risks. A system of
strict liability that includes a contributory negligence defense and adjusts
damages to include lost life expectancy would provide both efficient deter-
rence to risk producers and appropriate compensation to victims." 9 In
general, however, tort damages underestimate the true cost of risky activ-
ity, which causes inefficient risk-reduction incentives.
C. Risk-Reduction Incentives and Social Insurance
Whereas tort liability provides at least some safety incentives for pro-
ducers by raising their costs for unsafe products, the current social insur-
ance structure has few or no safety incentive effects. This structure's main
difficulty is that it does not link funding mechanisms to safety perform-
ance. For example, a firm's tax payments for the Social Security disability
102. Id. § 3:8.
103. R. POSNER, supra note 1, § 6.12.
104. S. SPEISER, supra note 100, § 3:2. The allocation of commodities that are jointly consumed
by the household is necessarily somewhat arbitrary.
105. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
106. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, § 6.12.
107. Id.
108. If pain and suffering were fully compensated, damages awards would be much more sub-
stantial than they are currently. This is because pain and suffering awards are not intended to reflect
lost years of life due to the accident. Thus, while a burn victim may receive some compensation for the
pain and suffering endured, any shortened life expectancy will not be compensated.
109. See A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 1, at 42-49.
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program are not correlated with its accident history,11 even though the
costs of supporting the disabled and survivors of fatal accidents vary sys-
tematically. This means that firms receive no market valuation of their
risky activity and have no incentive to reduce risks.
In contrast, workers' compensation programs do attempt to link funding
mechanisms to each firm's performance. The Black Lung program, which
is a targeted compensation program for the coal mining industry, finances
benefits through an output-related tax.1 This is a major improvement
over the typical social insurance program. However, while this approach
captures the effect of a firm's scale of operations on risks produced, it
ignores mine safety for any given level of production. The program creates
a disincentive for production in an industry that is generally unsafe, but it
does not reward firms that invest in safety improvements.
Similarly, the government bases workers' compensation for small firms
not on the safety performance of individual employers, but on the average
performance of the industry most representative of a firm's operations."'
In contrast, it merit-rates larger firms or they self-insure, both of which
tend to promote efficient safety incentives."' In all these cases, the level of
workers' compensation payments is below that of tort damages for any
given injury," 4  indicating inefficient risk-reduction incentives. The
implicit markets for risk in hazardous jobs also affect those incentives.
Workers' compensation is a valued component of workers' pay packages,
especially for those in hazardous industries." 5 The benefits reduce the
wages the firm would otherwise have to pay to workers in hazardous jobs.
Indeed, because of the insurance function they serve, risk-averse workers
value benefits at more than their actuarial cost as long as the program
does not overprovide benefits-."' In addition, the employer's compensation
premiums have favorable tax consequences." 7 As a result, workers' com-
pensation premiums do not impose annual costs on employers that do not
110. 42 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982).
111. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Coal
producers are currently required to pay $1.10 per ton of coal extracted from underground mines and
$0.55 per ton from surface mines, provided that the tax does not exceed 4.4% of the price at which
each ton is sold. A portion of the funds collected is used to reimburse the Black Lung Disability Trust
Fund for advances it pays to victims of pneumoconiosis. The rates decrease to $0.50 and $0.25 per
ton, respectively, when there are no outstanding reimbursements or interest thereon.
112. See Chelius & Smith, Experience-Rating and Injury Prevention, in SAFETY IN THE
WORKFORCE: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 128 (1983)
113. See W.K. VIsCUSI & M. MOORE, supra note 89.
114. See supra Table 2.
115. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing market mechanism providing com-
pensation for engaging risk).
116. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 12, at 249-61.
117. W.K. Viscusi & M. Moore, Have Increases in Workers' Compensation Benefits Paid for
Themselves?, (Nov. 1986) (manuscript on file with author).
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correspond to efficient deterrence levels."' The net effect of the premiums
on safety is therefore negligible.
Workers' compensation programs have serious moral hazard problems
that undermine deterrence on the job.119 This problem is most evident
with respect to how soon workers return to work after suffering an
injury. 2 If benefits fully replace a worker's earnings, they reduce his
incentive to earn the same amount. Although benefit plans can address
this problem of adverse incentives through benefit caps and duration lim-
its,' these constraints raise the concern that individuals meriting assis-
tance do not recover benefits. Thus, these plans are not as prevalent as
one might expect.
In short, even workers' compensation, the social insurance scheme that
passes benefits along to claimants with the fewest possible distortions,'22
does not create efficient risk-reduction incentives. Four factors prevent it
from doing so: first, the program does not index compensation premiums
to a firm's safety record; second, premiums are tax deductible; third,
workers require lower wages than they normally would because of the
insurance function provided by workers' compensation; and fourth, the
program creates incentives that distort worker choices.
D. Risk-Reduction Incentives and Regulation
Regulation has great potential to set efficient levels of safety in society.
Depending upon available technologies, the government can manipulate
standards governing risky activity over a wide range of risks. In extreme
cases, it may ban certain products or activities altogether. The difficult
problem with regulations is crafting them so as to create efficient risk-
reduction incentives.
Regulations are distinctive because they arise from a variety of sources.
Agencies promulgate regulations based on scientific evidence or wide-
spread accident patterns. This process is subject to the same political
forces that drive other types of government action. Individual parties
118. Currently, workers' compensation premiums are roughly a break-even proposition for most
firms. Thus, the safety incentives of the premiums tend to be offset by the additional wage reductions
and tax advantages associated with such compensation.
119. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
120. One controversial analysis of the substantial relationship between the length of workers'
absences and workers' compensation is provided by Johnson, Work Disincentives of Benefit Payments,
in SAFETY AND THE WORKFORCE: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
138 (1983).
121. For example, in the 1976 time period analyzed in W.K. Viscusi & M. MOORE, supra note
89, Utah limited temporary total disability benefits to 312 weeks, and there were similar limitations in
18 other states. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS
19 (1976).
122. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Yale Journal on Regulation
exposed to risk can sometimes initiate action as well, as in the case of
OSHA inspections prompted by worker complaints or fatalities.128 Simi-
larly, when a significant number of product-related accidents suggests a
defect, NHTSA or the CPSC can initiate product recalls. 24 Moreover,
some statutes empower individuals and organizations to bring citizen suits
to force firms to comply with regulatory standards.2 5
The regulatory process involves substantial delays at the outset of a
rulemaking. An agency must identify a problem area, prepare a regula-
tory analysis, receive approval from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), and provide for extensive comment before issuing an
authoritative regulation." 6 The regulatory process shapes fairly perma-
nent rules that provide clear guidance in creating risk-reduction incen-
tives. The problem with regulations is that they must be carefully
designed to create efficient incentives.
The danger of poorly designed regulations was exposed in a recent
study of the cost-effectiveness of forty-four proposed or enacted health and
safety standards. Table 3 demonstrates the range of variation in the cost
of saving a life under some of the regulations.
123. 49 C.F.R. § 554.4 (1987).
124. The CPSC bases its actions on its injury surveillance system data. See W.K. Viscusi, REGU-
LATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 34, at 48-54.
125. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25249.7 (West Supp. 1988).
126. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). The process is even more complex
than indicated by the Act because agencies' regulatory agendas must be approved annually before they
can proceed. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(Supp. IV 1986).
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Table 3127
The Cost of Regulations Per Life Saved
Proposed (P) Thousands of
or Final (F) Dollars (1984)
Regulation Year Agency Per Life Saved
Steering Column (F) 1967 NHTSA $100
Passive Restraints (F) 1984 NHTSA 300
Children's Sleepwear
Flammability (F) 1973 CPSC 1,300
Asbestos (F) 1972 OSHA 7,400
Acrylonitrile (F) 1978 OSHA 37,600
Asbestos (P) 1986 OSHA 89,300
Arsenic (F) 1978 OSHA 92,500
Asbestos (P) 1986 EPA 104,200
Benzene/Storage (P) 1984 EPA 202,000
Land Disposal (P) 1986 EPA 3,500,000
Formaldehyde (P) 1985 OSHA 72,000,000
The study generally shows that many regulations save lives at a cost
that is greater than the private valuation of life."' This means that if
efficient control of risks is the sole objective of a risk-management system,
then regulations are far too stringent in many cases. The study also shows
that when technological change is not very costly, as with steering column
controls, regulation can save lives quite inexpensively. However, when
products do not have inexpensive substitutes, as is the case with land dis-
posal facilities, the cost of saving lives can be extremely expensive. Regu-
lation is most efficient when directed at industries that can respond
quickly and when information and technological changes are less costly.
Table 4 provides a summary of various studies concerned with the effi-
cacy and effects of a variety of regulations.
127. Morrall, A Review of the Record, REGULATION Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25, 30.
128. The private valuation of life ranges from $5,000,000 to $6,000,000. See supra note 83, and
Table I and accompanying text.
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Table 4129
Summary of Effects of Regulation
Class of Regulations General Conclusion
(Investigator)
Product Safety
1. CPSC -- General
(Viscusi)
2. CPSC -- Mattresses
(Linneman)
3. CPSC -- Safety Caps
(Viscusi)
4. NHTSA -- Seatbelts
(Peltzman)
5. NHTSA -- Seatbelts
(Crandall & Graham)










10. EPA -- Air
(Crandall)
11. EPA -- Water
(Magat & Viscusi)
12. NRC -- Nuclear
(Wood)
Hazard Warnings
13. Worker and consumer
(Viscusi & Magat)
Few standards and no significant
beneficial effects on safety.
No significant beneficial effect on
safety.
No significant beneficial effect on
safety due to offsetting behavioral
response.
No significant beneficial effect on
safety due to offsetting behavioral
response.
Offsetting response to seatbelts exists
but does not negate their beneficial
effects.
Excessively stringent drug screening
leads to lag in obtaining health-
enhancing drugs.
No significant health benefits of
prescription requirement.
Need to set priorities and promulgate
more balanced regulations.
Weak enforcement. No significant
effects until 1980s, when small effects
are observed.
Improvements are needed in
enforcement; a market-based pollution
tax should be implemented.
Frequent enforcement and substantial
effect on pollution by pulp and paper
mills.
Need to reorganize entire agency and
streamline licensing process.
"Educational" efforts that provide no
new information are unsuccessful, but
warnings that convey new knowledge
can be effective.
129. Sources (referenced by Study number): (1) W.K. Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PROD-
UrT SAFETY .(1984); Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regula-
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The studies included in Table 4 indicate that a regulatory regime must
surmount three main difficulties to become an attractive policy alternative:
(1) inadequate regulatory design;1"' (2) ineffective and shoddy enforce-
ment of efficient regulations; and (3) offsetting behavior of workers and
consumers that counteracts some of the salutary effects of regulation.
The first major problem with regulations is that they may not enhance
safety even if they are effectively enforced. For example, of the few regu-
lations that the CPSC has promulgated, 3 ' almost none is strongly related
to safety.1 2 In the case of prescription medicine requirements, restrictions
on access to drugs have not had the expected benefits in terms of safer
drug use.13 In the case of workplace safety, OSHA's standards may be
less effective than performance-oriented alternatives. 4
A second and more pervasive problem with regulations is that entities
empowered to enforce them may not do so. Proper enforcement is a func-
tion of information, monitoring costs, and sanctions for violations. In some
instances, agencies enforce standards strictly; for example, FDA must
approve new pharmaceuticals before they can be sold."3 5 These regula-
tions are associated with full compliance, as are requirements that cars
have seatbelts"'3 and that medicine bottles have safety caps.1 7 Similarly,
tion, 28 J.L. & ECON. 527 (1985) [hereinafter Viscusi, Consumer Behavior]; (2) Linneman, The
Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability Standard, 13 J.L. & ECON.
461 (1980); (3) Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on Aspirin
and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 Am. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 324 (1984); (4) Peltzman, The
Effects of Automobile Safety Regulations, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677 (1975); (5) Crandall & Graham,
Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 328 (1984); (6) H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND THE RISKS (1983); (7) Peltzman, The Health
Effects of Mandatory Prescriptions, 30 J.L. & ECON. 207 (1987); (8) L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF
SOCIAL REGULATION (1981); (9) Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regula-
tion, 1973-1983, 17 RAND J. ECON. 567 (1986) [hereinafter Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational
Safety and Health Regulation]; (10) R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR (1983); (11) Magat & Viscusi, The Effectivenss of EPA's
Regulatory Enjbrcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, - J.L. & ECON. - (1989)
(forthcoming); (12) W. WOOD, NUCLEAR SAFETY: RISKS AND REGULATION (1984); (13) LEARNING
ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORK RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION (W.K. Viscusi & W.
Magat eds. 1987).
130. Particularly severe legal constraints on cost-benefit tradeoffs are imposed on EPA air pollu-
tion regulations. See R. CRANDALL, supra note 2, at 32-57.
131. See W.K. VISCUSI, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 34, at 58.
132. Indeed, these regulations have had no significant effect on overall product safety or on safety
of specific products, such as mattresses and carpets. Id. at 71-86.
133. See Peltzman, supra note 129 (1987).
134. A prominent example is OSHA's machine guard standards. See supra note 34. See also
OSHA SAFETY REGULATION: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 15 (P. MacAvoy ed.
1977); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 73, at 36-38.
135. See supra note 65.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1982); 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.209-.210 (1988).
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EPA water pollution regulations have reasonably high rates of compli-
ance"38 because they require firms to submit monthly reports regarding
their discharges and EPA to inspect firms roughly once a year.139 Thus, if
information and monitoring costs are relatively low, compliance rates tend
to be quite high.
Weak enforcement sanctions compound the problems created by moni-
toring difficulties, hampering regulatory performance even further. OSHA
regulations only modestly reduce worker injuries because they require
only rare inspections and because their sanctions for noncompliance are
usually inconsequential.1 40 Other classes of regulations that lack strong
enforcement provisions include those governing the dumping of toxic
wastes, where the injuring party often cannot be identified. In these and
other instances in which enforcement is not effective, regulations are
inefficient.
A third difficulty with regulations is that they cause offsetting behav-
ioral responses by consumers that counteract beneficial regulatory effects.
For example, in the case of seatbelt regulations,"4 the use of belts reduces
the risk-reduction incentives that drivers might otherwise face. Wearing a
seatbeh may decrease the likelihood of safe driving, leading some analysts
to conclude that drivers wearing seatbelts cause additional injuries to
pedestrians and motorcyclists. 42 Safety cap regulations also induce a
potentially counterproductive behavioral response: 43 some individuals
now leave bottles open because it is so difficult to grapple with the caps.' 44
Moreover, caps have lulled some parents into a false sense of security,
causing them unintentionally to increase their children's access to the
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1472 (1982); 16 C.F.R. § 1700.15 (1988).
138. For an analysis of compliance rates for these standards, see W. Magat & W.K. Viscusi, The
Effectiveness of EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards (June
1988) (working paper manuscript on file with author).
139. Id.
140. The average facility covered by OHSA regulations will be inspected once every 34 years at
the current rate of enforcement activity. Currently the total annual penalties levied by OSHA are
under $10,000,000. Viscusi, Reforming OSHA Regulation of Workplace Risks, in REGULATORY
REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 234, 254-58 (1986). For a recent assessment of the effect of
OSHA enforcement and a discussion of the data presented in Table 3, see Viscusi, The Impact of
Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, supra note 129.
OSHA recently levied its heaviest penalty ever against a single employer when it fined a
meatpacker $4,330,000 "for hundreds of 'egregious' and 'willful' violations at [one of its] plant[sl."
Hershey, Meatpacker Fined a Record Amount on Plant Injuries, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1988, at 1,
col. 2.
141. See supra note 136.
142. See Peltzman, supra note 129. But see Crandall & Graham, supra note 129.
143. See Viscusi, Consumer Behavior, supra note 130.
144. Id. at 544.
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products. 45 As a result, the number of analgesic poisonings has increased,
offsetting the expected beneficial effects of safety caps.14
None of these problems, except perhaps occasional offsetting behavioral
responses, is intractable. Society can establish whatever health and safety
standards it believes are appropriate, with the only concerns being the cost
of providing the increased safety and the value of the increased safety to
society. For risk regulation to realize its potential, however, regulatory
design and enforcement must improve. Society can resolve these problems
more easily than the problems associated with both tort liability147 and
social insurance.'48 In addition, once an agency promulgates regulations,
social costs need not be incurred again. In this sense, regulation is a larger
investment in a more permanent solution than the ones offered by insur-
ance or tort liability.
IV. The Adequacy of Compensation
Successful risk management does not imply that health and safety risks
will cease to exist. Illnesses and injuries will always occur in a world that
values hazardous products and activities. The goal of creating risk-
reduction incentives is to reduce risky activity, not to prohibit it. In light
of the inevitable illnesses and injuries confronting society, it is an impor-
tant social objective to provide appropriate levels of compensation. A com-
mon benchmark of appropriate compensation is the amount of insurance
an individual would purchase at actuarially fair prices. 49 This Part con-
siders two structural traits of risk-management institutions: the identity of
the initiating party and the time it takes to receive compensation."'
A. The Initiating Party and Time Lags
Some party must activate an institution before it can compensate indi-
viduals who engage a risk or suffer an injury. In a market system, those
who undertake a risk are the initiating parties. For example, all workers
145. Id. at 538-44.
146. Id. at 544-48.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 87-109.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 110-22.
149. Individuals transfer income from their pre-accident to post-accident endowments until the
marginal utility derived from insurance just equals the marginal utility of money when healthy. If all
losses are purely financial, the optimal result entails "full" compensation. For a mathematical proof of
this proposition, see K. ARROW, supra note 52, at 212-16. When nonfinancial losses fundamentally
affect one's welfare, this relationship need not hold since the underlying preferences will have been
altered. See W.K. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS, supra note 17, at 264-70; Spence, Consumer
Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Product Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 567-69 (1977).
150. Government regulation is not a compensatory mechanism except to the extent that it acts
prophylactically to reduce the number of injuries. Although this benefit can be construed as compensa-
tion, it is difficult to measure and beyond the scope of this Article.
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in dangerous jobs and all consumers of hazardous products require com-
pensation if they are to bear the additional risk of employment or
consumption. 5 '
In contrast, under tort liability or social insurance, only individuals
injured by the risky product or activity may seek compensation.' 52 To the
extent that compensation creates efficient risk-reduction incentives,
restricting eligibility for compensation makes economic sense. Risk pro-
ducers perceive no economic difference between liability for one award of
$1,000,000 and a thousand awards of $1000, although the large single
damages award generates more interest among affected persons and spurs
the filing of claims. Under social insurance schemes funded on the basis of
a firm's history, the same analysis applies.
Institutional timing is another important structural trait in this analysis
of compensation. Market compensation generally operates ex ante.5
When risks are traded in the market, parties receive full compensation
prior to the injury. In contrast, injured persons receive compensation from
a successful tort liability claim ex post, and the claim process may take
years to complete." 4 Social insurance also operates ex post, but generally
the lag time is shorter unless the agency disputes the claim.
55
B. Private Insurance as a Benchmark for Compensation
One option an individual may have to ensure compensation for injuries
is to purchase comprehensive private insurance. Life insurance and medi-
cal insurance policies that cover all risks are more efficient than policies
covering individual risks. For example, the decision to purchase flight
insurance is irrational because flight insurance is considerably more ex-
151. The magnitude of the wage or price differential is, however, more narrowly determined. In
setting the premium the focus is on the marginal worker or consumer; that is, the person least willing
to purchase the product or perform the work in question. The compensating differential will leave this
marginal person indifferent to facing therisk, and all infra-marginal workers will be paid more than
they require to engage the same risk. The result is full or excessive ex ante compensation. See supra
notes 6-8.
152. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. This feature causes practical difficulties
because the injured party may be dead with no survivors. Of course, in some cases the survivors of the
deceased may be able to file a claim.
153. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
154. The average product liability claim, for example, has a lifetime of 1.6 years or 4 years to
reach a verdict. This estimate comes from a sample of over 10,000 closed product liability claims.
Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for
Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 326-27 (1986).
155. Where prompt compensation is highly valued, the timing of the market may seem preferable.
A more comprehensive examination of timing effects, however, reduces one's enthusiasm for ex ante
treatment of risks. In particular, lag time is irrelevant with respect to the creation of risk-reduction
incentives, provided that the damages award and associated interest amounts are set appropriately and
the firm remains in business. (The solvency issue is particularly relevant in mass tort actions.) What
matters to a firm is the level of discounted expected costs of accidents, not the timing of those costs.
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pensive than conventional life insurance.156 Single policy coverage for in-
dividual risks imposes greater administrative costs and limits the insurer's
ability to pool different kinds of risks. As a consequence, coverage is more
expensive.
1 5 7
Private insurance is inefficient for three reasons. First, insurance com-
panies typically sell policies at rates that are not actuarially fair.'58 When
insurance is more expensive than the expected costs of accidents, risk neu-
tral individuals do not insure fully. "9 Second, adverse selection of risk
causes only poor risks to insure in some cases. 6 Third, moral hazard
adversely affects the risk-taking actions of the insured, increasing the
number of injuries. 6 ' Although the result is a variety of private insurance
offerings, the coverage of the available policies falls short of those that
would prevail in an ideal market.
C. Compensation Under The Various Institutions
Sources of compensation other than privately purchased insurance
include the market, social insurance, and tort damages. 62 Markets pro-
vide compensation to all individuals who engage risk;'6 3 they compensate
for the ex ante probability that an injury will occur. In markets, an indi-
vidual who is actually injured does not receive additional compensation in
comparison to the worker who engages the risk but is not injured.
In contrast, tort damages awards serve an insurance function. For a
product that continues to involve some risk and the chance of a damages
award, the product's price incorporates the expected award or the firm's
liability insurance premium. In effect, consumers purchase product-
specific insurance 64 within the constraints of the tort system. 6 5 Such
purchases of insurance provide less efficient risk coverage than do broader
insurance policies covering multiple risks.
Although tort liability often provides substantial compensation, the
common belief that product liability awards lead to windfall gains is erro-
156. For a complete analysis, see Eisner & Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of Choice, 69
J. POL. ECON. 355 (1961).
157. Id.
158. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
159. Although expected payments are below premium levels because of the administrative costs
and insurance company profits, the resulting insurance loading is offset to some degree by the prefera-
ble tax treatment of life insurance provided as an employee fringe benefit. See 26 U.S.C. § 79 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
160. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 150.
163. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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neous. A person who suffers pecuniary loss should be made whole.166 For
example, an injured wage earner should be compensated for lost earnings
and medical expenses. The actual value of court awards and settlements
is, however, often less than the actual losses suffered by the victim.
Table 5 summarizes a number of studies relating to loss replacement
rates for product liability claims.
Table 5167
Loss Replacement Rates
All Product Liablity Claims
Panel A
Bodily
Injury Loss Mean Fraction
of Range Mean Bodily Mean Bodily Replacement of Claims
($1000s) Injury Loss Injury Pymnt Ratio in Group
0-10 614 4,467 7.27 .91
10-25 15,413 49,477 3.21 .04
25-50 35,071 70,493 2.01 .02
50-100 74,019 185,048 2.501 .01
100-200 137,242 91,952 .67 .01
200-500 278,838 189,610 .68 .01
500-1,000 665,223 286,046 .43 .00
Over 1,000 2,131,438 532,859 .25 .00
Overall 12,707 13,281 1.05 1.00
166. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 903.
167. Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensa-
tion for Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 339 & Table 5 (1986).
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Claims Where Plaintiff Receives Court Award
Panel B
Bodily
Injury Loss Mean Fraction
Range Mean Bodily Mean Bodily Replacement of Claims
($1000s) Injury Loss Injury Pymnt Ratio in Group
0-10 1,432 27,767 19.39 .67
10-25 17,213 78,493 4.56 .16
25-50 39,678 108,320 2.73 .06
50-100 63,447 107,226 1.69 .04
100-200 124,872 194,801 1.56 .03
200-500 259,189 575,400 2.22 .03
500-1,000 602,273 265,000 .44 .01
Over 1,000 2,250,000 112,500 .05 .01
Overall 38,877 67,799 1.74 1.00
The data indicate that insurers tend to overcompensate small losses
because insurers are willing to provide appropriate compensation for pain
and suffering and to settle claims, thereby avoiding administration and
litigation costs. However, insurers tend to undercompensate large losses.'
Court awards in panel B of Table 5 follow the same general pattern as do
claims overall, shown in panel A. It is clear from these data that tort
liability does not always provide appropriate compensation.
In addition, the damages awarded generally exceed the amount most
victims actually receive. Contingent fee arrangements typically reduce a
damages award by roughly one-third. In complex cases, such as asbestos-
related claims, recovery of damages may be either delayed for many years
or never paid to claimants at all.' Furthermore, some legitimate claims
might not succeed, and particularly risk-averse claimants often settle for
less than their expected court award.' Claims in categories for which the
award is highly variable are especially likely to settle for less than the
expected damages award.'
168. It should be emphasized that these results reflect stated losses, not actual losses.
169. Viscusi, Structuring a Disease Policy, supra note 3, at 64.
170. See Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 118
(1988).
171. For a discussion of these formulas, see id. at 107-08. They show that despite the loss of the
contingency fee, the effective after-tax replacement rate is greater than 0.67, see W.K. Viscusi & M.
MOORE, supra note 89, because damages awards are accorded favorable tax status. 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (1982).
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Social insurance is similar to tort liability in that it performs an insur-
ance function. However, the general purpose of social insurance programs
is to provide broad-based coverage for survivors of deceased persons, the
disabled, and victims of occupational accidents.1"2 Because the programs
typically attempt to compensate those who most need compensation, pay-
ments often tend to be lower than private insurance payments because the
programs cover a broad range of individuals and injuries." 8
Workers' compensation is more generous, with two-thirds earnings
replacement for most injuries.1"" In addition, this form of compensation
enjoys a favorable tax status.1"" On average, the result may be that there
is close to full after-tax earnings replacement from workers' compensation
for most injuries.'76 Increases in benefits over the past decade have led to
levels of compensation that are close to the efficient level for the average
worker in a hazardous job. 17 7 In short, workers' compensation comes close
to levelling pre- and post-accident marginal utility of income. Thus, social
insurance programs that mimic the more generous workers' compensation
model can alleviate the problems of partial compensation from which pri-
vate insurance and tort damages awards tend to suffer. Social insurance in
combination with efficiently enforced risk regulations is the surest way to
provide both appropriate compensation and efficient deterrence.
V. Overcoming the Problems of Institutional Overlap
There is no formal method for assigning institutional roles and reallo-
cating institutional responsibilities. As a result, current risk-reduction
incentives and levels of compensation indicate an improper institutional
mix. This Part describes the shortcomings that result from the imperfect
interplay among the market, the tort system, social insurance, and
regulation.
172. The special treatment of job injuries rather than product injuries stems primarily from the
need to decrease the costs of litigating those accidents. For a more complete discussion of the history
of, and the multiple rationales for, workers' compensation, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20,
§ 80.
173. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
174. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 121, at 19.
175. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l) (1982).
176. In a reasonably representative national sample of workers, the effective replacement rate,
taking into account the favorable tax status of benefits, was 83.5%. See W.K. Viscusi & M. MOORE,
supra note 89.
177. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 12.
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A. Risk-Reduction Incentives and Institutional Overlap
If markets functioned perfectly, the incentives they generated would
lead to efficient levels of risk.' Augmenting market processes with social
insurance arrangements would not substantially alter the efficient out-
come, because risk-related taxes do not finance general social insurance
mechanisms.' 9 If markets and social insurance do generate an efficient
outcome, then efficient government regulation simply confirms it. More-
over, if the other institutions are inefficient, then appropriately designed
regulations can fully remedy any shortcomings that exist.1
80
1. The Problem of Inefficient Risk-Reduction Incentives
The first real difficulties arise when tort liability is superimposed on the
system. If no markets for risk exist, and if regulations or merit-rated
social insurance do not address risks, then tort liability can serve a con-
structive role. However, the tort system by itself ultimately creates ineffi-
cient incentives because of the manner in which it determines damages. 8'
Perhaps the best situation is one in which the institutions lead to partial,
but less than efficient, control of risk, so that the additional incentives
generated by tort liability augment the other incentives by just the appro-
priate amount.
A second, recurring problem in this scheme is a skewing of the market
caused by overly stringent regulation. 8 Currently, OSHA strictly regu-
lates asbestos exposures with an average cost per life saved of
$89,300,000.183 EPA has proposed even more stringent regulations for
environmental exposures to asbestos. These standards create an expected
cost per life saved of $104,200,000."8 The inefficiencies of such regula-
tions are obvious in light of the response to widespread publicity concern-
ing asbestos. The substantial costs of product liability insurance coverage
178. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
179. Although workers' compensation benefits are merit-rated, particularly for large firms, the
estimated wage cuts that workers incur in return for these benefits roughly offset the premium
amount; the overall safety incentives remain efficient if workers' compensation is provided in an other-
wise efficient market. A problem arises only for small firms that are not taxed based on their safety
performance. In this case, the wage offset from providing workers' compensation without effective
experience rating in effect leads to a subsidy of unsafe conditions. See supra notes 110-22 and accom-
panying text.
180. Regulations also effectuate standards that society chooses to set more stringently than effi-
ciency alone would suggest.
181. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 131-35, Table 2 and accompanying text.
183. This number was generated from an OSHA analysis prepared for OMB. Morrall, supra
note 127, at 30; see supra Table 3.
184. Id.
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for firms using asbestos 8 5 bolster the already strong market incentives
that caused the manufacture of asbestos-related products to plummet.' 6
In the case of asbestos, high regulatory thresholds have created greater-
than-optimal expected liabilities and inefficient risk-reduction incentives.
2. Overcoming the Problem of Inefficient Risk-Reduction Incentives
The problems of institutional overlap and inefficient risk-reduction
incentives are not insurmountable. One possible solution is to attack them
by expanding the common law defense of "assumption of risk"' on the
grounds that the injured party receives compensation ex ante through a
wage or price differential.' 8 This defense is currently applied only in
situations of express 8 9 or implied90 consent by the injured party. From a
market perspective, however, all risk negotiations based on accurate per-
ceptions involve implied consent. This implied consent applies to risks that
arise in any activity or from any product. In contrast, tort liability focuses
on implied consent regarding a specific hazard, such as knowingly driving
a car with defective brakes.
To reduce the potential overlap with market-induced risk-reduction
incentives, courts could broaden the assumption of risk defense to include
the entire spectrum of assumed risks. To do so would require a detailed
assessment of both the risk information available to the parties and its
implications for risk perceptions and market operation. Courts would need
to focus their attention on the adequacy of market remedies, at least when
a market exists for the risk in question.
Allowing firms to plead compliance with government regulations as a
defense could also reduce the overlap of tort liability with government
regulations. 9 ' Currently, the role of regulatory compliance in judicial
proceedings is largely one-sided: noncompliance with regulations suggests
185. See Viscusi, Structuring a Disease Policy, supra note 3, at 59-60. These firms must now
generally self-insure because the insurance industry underwrites very little coverage. Insurance Ser-
vices Office, General Liability Records, 1980-84 (computer files on product liability policies written in
the United States) (on file with author).
186. One useful index of industry output is the employment level, which has plummeted in the
asbestos industry. In 1976 employment stood at 20,700, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY
26 (1976), but by 1983 it had dropped to 11,900, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY 4 (1983).
187. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 496A.
188. But see supra text accompanying note 9.
189. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 496B. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 68.
190. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 496C.
191. For a discussion of compliance with government regulations as a defense, see Viscusi, Prod-
uct Liability and Regulation, supra note 4, at 300-01.
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that a product either is defective or was negligently produced, but compli-
ance with the standard does not free the defendant of liability.
Table 6 shows the relationship between the incidence of a regulatory
violation in a particular case and a verdict in the plaintiff's favor.
Table 6192
Panel A
Regulatory Violations and Product Related Claims
No Any CPSC OSHA Other
Fraction of Violation Violation Violation Violation Violation
Claims .81 .19 .06 .02 .11
Successful .76 .81 .80 .83 .82
claims
Claims .20 .13 .13 .13 .13
dropped
Claims .77 .83 .81 .85 .84
settled out
of court











192. Insurance Services, Product Liablity Offices Closed Claims Survey (1977) (data generated by
author from computer tapes containing data from survey) (on file with author).
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Panel B
Regulatory Violations and Product Liability Claims for On-The-Job Injuries
No Any CPSC OSHA Other
Fraction of Violation Violation Violation Violation Violation
















Table 6 panel A provides data for product liability claims; panel B
contains data concerning on-the-job accidents involving products. Twenty-
eight percent of the job-related claims involved work situations that did
not meet applicable standards; the comparable figure for product liability
claims is nineteen percent. Differences in the other violation groupings
also appear significant; this group includes violations of other federal,
state, or municipal standards. The presence of a regulatory violation
improves a plaintiff's prospects for recovery for both types of injuries.
Regulatory violations also lower the fraction of claims dropped, increase
the likelihood of an out-of-court settlement, and lead to greater overall
payments of claims. The only surprising result is that product injuries
with regulatory violations are less likely to lead to claimant success in
court. This may reflect self-selection of claims, with the best claims set-
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Risks are often the target of specific regulations. OSHA's ladder stan-
dard, for example, establishes very detailed requirements for a safe lad-
der.19 At least when regulations are highly pertinent to the hazard in
question, compliance alone should suffice to remove liability.194
Although regulatory compliance can make a significant contribution, it
is not the fundamental issue. It serves as an imperfect proxy for whether
risk levels are efficient. Before adopting regulatory compliance as a
defense, society should be certain that regulations are set at efficient levels.
Fortunately, regulation as an institution is flexible enough to allow the
necessary adjustments.
B. Compensation and Institutional Overlap
Although risk-reduction incentives can be efficient in the absence of tort
liability, tort damages can play a valuable role in compensating those
injured parties. Because of the limited funding available for social insur-
ance programs, reformers may find it desirable to augment market and
insurance compensation by transferring funds from the injurer to the vic-
tim. This promotes greater equity and compensation in those cases where
the injurer can be identified.
The potential for the institutions to overlap and provide multiple recov-
eries presents a serious efficiency problem. If private insurance, social
insurance, and tort damages all were to compensate the injured party, the
victim would collect three times for the same injury, resulting in inappro-
priate compensation and inefficient risk-reduction incentives.
Policymakers should take measures to ensure that the injured party
cannot reap windfall gains. Offset provisions and subrogation rules can
limit the importance of such overlaps by preventing "double-dipping."
Similarly, a subrogation action by a workers' compensation carrier against
193. 29 C.F.R §§ 1910.25-.27 (1987).
194. One must exercise care in drawing such conclusions in the case of regulations that are not
updated regularly. Once a product is on the market, review is much less extensive. Because testing
protocols change over time and even well-designed tests may not detect all potential risks that are
present, the product's ability to pass an initial screening might not be a reliable index of the appropri-
ateness of a defense of compliance after additional hazards are discovered.
Regulatory compliance can sometimes be inappropriate as a complete defense because government
regulations might not cover the hazard in question. This lack of coverage is particularly great for
product risks because the CPSC has very few regulatory standards. The Agency relies primarily on
recalls of defective products, and there must be a prominent national pattern for such a recall to be
warranted. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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a negligent producer enables the carrier to receive compensation for bene-
fits paid to the injured party. This outcome is more attractive than a sys-
tem in which the injured party obtains compensation from both the work-
ers' compensation system and the third-party producer under tort liability.
By contrast, if the employer can file a successful subrogation action
against the producer of the equipment that caused the injury, the award
increases the purchase price of the defective equipment. This price in-
crease ensures that the resulting lower wage eliminates the possibility of
overcompensating the injured employee. 95
The claimant should have no preference as to which mechanism com-
pensates him. Reducing the compensation received from private and social
insurance is the only way both to eliminate the potential for windfall
gains and to preserve the incentive function of tort liability. Although it
may seem unfair to reduce the amount paid by private insurance, in the
long run premiums will decrease to reflect the reduction in expected com-
pensation costs.
Although appropriate offset arrangements can handle multiple ex post
compensation, more difficult problems plague ex ante compensation. Pri-
vately traded risks in perfect markets lead to complete ex ante compensa-
tion; thus, any rationale for a damages award must stem from society's
concern over the difference between ex post actual damages and ex ante
probabilities. More generally, there should be some adjustment of com-
pensation levels to reflect the fact that individuals who receive both ex
ante and ex post compensation receive preferable treatment compared
with those who receive only ex post compensation. 96
Conclusion
Table 7 summarizes this Article's analyses and general assessments of
institutional performance. Column 1 provides a summary of the main
themes. Not all of these categories represent mutually exclusive concerns,
so one should be cautious of the method used to combine the ratings.
Moreover, the importance of each category varies in different contexts.
195. See generally Viscusi, The Interaction Between Product Liability and Workers' Compensa-
tion as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORG. - (1989) (forthcoming).
196. In the long run, anticipation of ex post compensation will raise the product price, but the
initial beneficiaries of both court awards and ex ante compensation will reap a windfall gain.
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Column 1 does provide, however, a convenient summary of the main
themes of this Article and a reasonably detailed checklist of factors that
are important in assessing institutional performance. A review of Table 7
shows that tort liability should play a decreasing role in achieving the
goals of creating risk-reduction incentives and compensating the injured.
As in the past, the tort system can promote risk-reduction incentives
and provide adequate compensation for accident victims in simple cases
involving only financial losses. Although other institutions may still have
competitive advantages, tort liability could be the foundation of an effec-
tive effort to manage some risky activity in these kinds of cases.
The efficacy of the tort system diminishes considerably in the context of
mass product liability suits. Many of the deficiencies of tort liability stem
from its individualized nature. Small-scale tort actions lack the economies
of scale necessary to provide the risk-reduction incentives and compensa-
tion that mass product liability claims require. Although class actions
remove some inefficiencies, the tort system tends to function poorly in
these situations.
The recent explosion of toxic tort cases has created even more funda-
mental difficulties because of the courts' inability to determine linkages
between producers' actions and victims' health status. In addition to the
intrinsic uncertainties involved, the courts lack the scientific expertise to
develop the necessary doctrines and causation rules relevant to multiple
and probabilistic causation. In these cases, government regulation is the
best institution to create efficient risk-reduction incentives and social
insurance is the best institution to provide appropriate compensation.
The superiority of regulation and social insurance in these types of
cases does not mean that tort liability cannot play a constructive role in
managing risks. Rather, it implies that the role of the tort system should
be subsidiary to the other institutions. Tort liability can create significant
risk-reduction incentives and compensate some of those who are injured.
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Table 7
Institutions to Control Risk and Their Performance
Risk-
Management Market Tort Social Government
Institution Forces Liability Insurance Regulation
Scope of Risk All perceived
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In addition, the tort system provides a useful forum for identifying poten-
tial targets for regulation and for addressing idiosyncratic risks not cov-
ered by broadly based regulations. However, tort reform proposals should
recognize the subsidiary role that tort liability must play in the future and
focus on achieving the traditional goals of the tort system through
increased use of government regulation and social insurance.

